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“Courts have played a salutary and corrective role in
innumerable instances. They are highly respected by our
people for that. At the same time, the dividing line between
judicial activism and judicial overreach is a thin one.
Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh said the above
while addressing a conference of Chief Ministers and Chief
Justices of the High Court in April 2007 at New Delhi.
This statement is perceived to be the fall out from the
widespread debates going on in various forums in India
regarding judicial accountability. At the conference of Chief
Justices of High Courts and Chief Ministers in the previous
year the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, said:
“There is growing dissatisfaction regarding the functioning of
the executive and the legislature and their ability to deliver
effective governance to meet the needs and challenges of our
times.
In this background, it is a matter of great satisfaction that
the public at large continues to hold our judiciary in high
esteem. The judiciary as custodians and watchdogs of the
fundamental rights of our people has discharged its
responsibility very well indeed.”
This article attempts to highlight some of the incidents
that would have contributed to the Prime Minister’s
change of stance. A noted constitutional lawyer and former
Solicitor General of India, Mr T R Andhyarjuna, wrote:
…“whilst the Indian higher judiciary is perhaps the most
powerful judiciaries in the world today and the socialist
perception of it is very high, accountability mechanisms
particularly in the disciplining of judges of superior court and
the representative character of the courts have not matched
with the power and esteem” (Judicial Accountability: India’s
Methods and Experience 2003).
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Constitution of India provides for judicial review
under Articles 32 (Supreme Court) and 226 (High Court).
The Supreme Court has pronounced that judicial review is
a fundamental feature of the constitution. The power of
judicial review by courts therefore is not subject to
amendment and thus has been effectively taken out of the
ﬁeld of Parliament’s power to amend or in anyway abridge.
The judiciary has declared a “hands-off ” command to the
legislature.
Judicial review is understood to be the revision of the
decree or sentence of an inferior court by a superior court.
Judicial review of executive or legislative actions is
controversial, unlike the judicial review of judicial actions.
The orders passed by lower courts which are either being
set aside, revised or modiﬁed, are greater in number than
reviews relating to executive orders or legislative actions.
However, criticisms of the judicial review of executive and
legislative actions are stronger and more vociferous.
In our constitutional scheme the judiciary alone has
been entrusted with the power and duty to test the
constitutional validity of legislative provisions and the
validity of administrative actions. The superior courts are
empowered to declare a statute ultra vires the constitution
and to nullify an executive action as unconstitutional.
These powers of judicial review are given not with a view
to make the judiciary a supreme body superior to the other
wings of the constitutional framework, but to ensure a
system of checks and balances between the legislature and
the executive on one hand, and the judiciary on the other.
The mechanism has been devised to function in such a way
that the unconstitutional actions of one of the wings are
corrected by the other, and vice versa. It is not the purpose
of judicial review to criticise legislative or executive actions,
as the opposition is expected to fulﬁl this function in a
democratic polity. On the contrary, the judiciary’s role is
to review executive and legislative actions and declare
whether those actions conform with the dictates of the
Constitution of India.
Justice Dr A S Anand, former Chief Justice of India and
former Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of
India, while addressing on “Judicial review – judicial
activism – need for caution” said:
“The legislature, the executive and the judiciary are three co-
ordinate organs of the state. All the three are bound by the
Constitution. The ministers representing the executive, the
elected candidates as Members of Parliament representing the
legislature and the judges of the Supreme Court and the High
Courts representing the judiciary have all to take oaths
prescribed by the Third Schedule of the Constitution. All of
them swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the
Constitution. When it is said, therefore, that the judiciary is
the guardian of the Constitution, it is not implied that the




Constitution. For the progress of the nation, however, it is
imperative that all the three wings of the state function in
complete harmony.
“A judicial decision either ‘stigmatises or legitimises’ a decision
of the legislature or of the executive. In either case the court
neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy, nor is it
concerned with its wisdom or expediency. Its concern is merely
to determine whether the legislation is in conformity with or
contrary of the provision of the Constitution It often includes
consideration of the rationality of the statute. Similarly, where
the court strikes down an executive order, it does so not in a
spirit of confrontation or to assert its superiority but in
discharge of its constitutional duties and the majesty of the
law. In all those cases, the court discharges its duty as a
judicial sentinel.”
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Courts of today are not remaining passive, with the
negative attitude of merely striking down a law or
preventing something being done. The new attitude is
towards positive afﬁrmative actions, and issuing orders and
decrees directing remedial actions.
In the estimation of an ordinary Indian citizen the
legislature and the executive have failed miserably in their
cherished duties towards the general public. The executive
and the legislators are made accountable for their actions.
Their nearness to the people generates high expectations
from the public and attracts sharp criticism whenever their
actions do not follow the expected lines. The common
citizen feels that the administration has become so
apathetic and non-performing that they have no other
option except to approach the judiciary to redress their
grievances. It is under this situation that the judiciary has
taken an activist approach. Judicial activism has ﬂourished
in India and acquired enormous legitimacy with the Indian
public. However, this activist approach by the judiciary is
bound to create friction and tension with the other organs
of the state. Such tension is natural and to some extent
desirable.
Judicial activism earned a humane face in India with the
liberalising of access to justice and granting of relief to
disadvantaged groups and the have-nots through public
interest litigation (PIL). A postal letter or even a postcard
addressed to the court is accepted for the purpose of
initiating prerogative writs, with courts disregarding the
technicalities. The Supreme Court of India relaxed the
traditional concept of locus by allowing public-spirited
citizens to bring public causes to the court. Thus, the
number of PIL actions has increased since 1977. The
growth of PIL post 1977 is mainly attributed to incidents
which happened during emergency rule between 1975 and
1977. One can see the marked differences between the
judicial approach prior to 1977 and post emergency rule in
India. This change of approach was in response to the
changing times and aspirations of the people. Several cases
of violations of fundamental human rights were reported
during the emergency regime, but still the approach of the
courts was conservative.
In ADM Jabalpur v Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 the Supreme
Court held that a detainee under preventive detention did
not have the common law right of securing from the courts
his release from an illegal and arbitrary preventive
detention order, even if it was passed without the authority
of law. The reason given by the court was that the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution were
suspended during the emergency.
There was a huge change in judicial approach after
emergency rule.
THE JUDICIARY IS NOT A DESPOTIC
BRANCH OF THE STATE
Although the Supreme Court of India has widened its
scope of interference in public administration and the
policy decisions of the government, it is well aware of the
limitations within which it should function. In the case of
P Ramachandran Rao v State of Karnataka, reported in (2002)
4 SCC 578, has observed that
“The Supreme Court does not consider itself to be an
imperium in imperio or would function as a despotic branch
of the State.”
The Indian Constitution does not envisage a rigid
separation of powers, the respective powers of the three
wings being well-deﬁned with the object that each wing
must function within the ﬁeld earmarked by the
constitution. The Supreme Court of India took all this into
account in the judgment reported in (1986) 4SCC 632 in
the case of State of Kerala v A Lakshmi Kutty, stating that
“Special responsibility devolves upon the judges to avoid an
over activist approach and to ensure that they do not trespass
within the spheres earmarked for the other two braches of the
State.”
The judges should not enter the ﬁelds constitutionally
earmarked for the legislature and the executive. Judges
cannot be legislators, as they have neither the mandate of
the people nor the practical wisdom to understand the
needs of different sections of society. They are forbidden
from assuming the role of administrators; governmental
machinery cannot be run by judges as that is not the
intention of our constitution makers. While interpreting
the provisions of the constitution the judiciary often
rewrites them without explicitly stating so. As a result of
this process some of the personal opinions of the judges
crystallize into legal principles and constitutional values.
A classic example of the above problem is the recent
order by the Supreme Court of India to demolish and seal
off all the commercial entities run in residential areas of
Delhi. Even though the Delhi Government passed a Bill
regularizing all the constructions, which were illegal, the 23
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Supreme Court of India took the view that all those places
should be sealed off. The Delhi Municipal Corporation
was reluctant to continue with the sealing drive because it
was against the popular sentiments of the people.
However, the Supreme Court remained steadfast in its
decision and the municipal authorities had no other option
except to go ahead. There were demonstrations and
violence against the sealing drive; the Congress Party, which
was in power during the sealing drive, lost municipal
councillor seats in the elections conducted during that
time. The argument over the economic, social and
physiological impact the sealing drive would create did not
dissuade the court.
The Supreme Court of India is well aware of its
limitations, and hence exercises self-restraint and caution
over encroachment of the ﬁeld exclusively reserved for the
legislature and the executive. The seven judge bench of the
Supreme Court declared in P Ramachandra Rao’s case that:
“The primary function of the Judiciary is to interpret the law.
It may lay down principles, guidelines and exhibit creativity in
the field left open and unoccupied by legislation. But they
cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly
meant for the legislature. It is no difficult to perceive the
dividing line between permissible legislation by judicial
directives and enacting law – the field exclusively reserved for
the legislature.”
In the case of Keshavanada Bharathi (1973) the Supreme
Court held for the ﬁrst time that a constitutional
amendment duly passed by the legislature was invalid for
damaging or destroying its basic structure. This was a
gigantic judicial leap unknown to any legal system. The
supremacy and permanency of the constitution was
ensured by this pronouncement, with the result that the
basic features of the constitution are now beyond the reach
of Parliament. The criticism of this judgment by the
Supreme Court is that since the court has not exhaustively
deﬁned what these basic features are, the judicial arm can
be extended any distance at will.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides that no
person shall be deprived of its life and liberty except
according to the procedure established by law has become
the most dynamic article in the hands of the Indian courts.
A whole new set of rights which were not explicitly
provided by the constitution were read into Article 21.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND ARTICLE
21
The Supreme Court of India gave a new interpretation
to Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the case of
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India. It became a great
trendsetter for further evolution of notions of
reasonableness and fairness.
When Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded, she
was served with the required notice under the Indian
Passport Act. She contended that the procedure
contemplated under the Act was in violation of the
constitution. The Supreme Court held that life does not
merely mean an animal-like existence, but an existence
with all the freedoms associated with it. The Supreme
Court stated for the ﬁrst that it is not enough merely to
prescribe a procedure for denying life and liberty; the
procedure itself must be fair and reasonable. This paved
the way for the concept of substantive due process, which
is not mentioned directly in the Indian Constitution
(unlike the American Constitution).
The concept of substantive due process was imported
into Article 21 by the decision in Maneka Gandhi. It was
asserted by the Supreme Court that the courts have the
power to not only judge the fairness and justness of
procedure established by a law for the purpose of Article
21, but also the power to judge and decide the
reasonableness of the law itself.
LEGISLATION BY THE JUDICIARY
The Supreme Court of India took serious stance on the
sexual harassment of women in the work place. It stated
that:
“Each Incident of sexual harassment of woman at workplace
results in violation of the fundamental rights of Gender
Equality and the Right to Life and Liberty.”
In the case of Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, reported in
(1997) 6 SCC 241, the Supreme Court lamented that the
legislature had not brought in comprehensive legislation to
deal with sexual harassment of women in the workplace,
and declared the law as follows:
“In view of the above, and in the absence of enacted law to
provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right
of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment
and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at
work places, guidelines and norms are hereby laid down for
strict observance. This is done in exercise of the power
available under Article 32 for enforcement of the fundamental
rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated
as the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141
of the Constitution of India.”
This is a clear case of judicial legislation and usurpation
of the power of the legislature, but ultimately it beneﬁts the
people. When the legislature slumbers, judicial usurpation
obtains legitimacy and approval from the general public.
There is frequent criticism that, even though 10 years have
elapsed since this Supreme Court decision, the legislature
has yet to come up with comprehensive legislation dealing
with the sexual harassment of women in the workplace.
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA
As can be the case in the United States of America and
the United Kingdom, ideological confrontation based on
the genuine concern for the welfare of the people arose24
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between the executive and legislature on the one hand and
the judiciary on the other. A conservative executive and a
progressive judiciary, or a progressive Parliament and a
conservative judiciary coexisting at the same point of time,
form the basis of judicial activism or judicial overreach, as
opposed to executive excesses or executive enthusiasm
beyond the bounds of law.
The evolution of the theory of judicial activism in India
can be traced back to the late 1960s or early 1970s during
the time when Mrs Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister
of India and an eminent lawyer and legal luminary, Mohan
Kumaramangalam, was the Union Minister. When the late
Mrs Gandhi attempted to introduce progressive socialistic
measures in order to implement her favourite slogan “garibi
hatao” (remove poverty) by abolishing Privy Purses and
privileges given to the erstwhile rajas and princes of the
princely states of pre-independent India, and nationalizing
the 14 major banks so as to serve the cause of the poorer
sections of the society in a more meaningful manner, a
conservative judiciary did not take it kindly and struck
down the relevant legislation as unconstitutional. What
happened to President Franklin Roosevelt during the
period of the great depression and to his new deal
legislation happened in India to Mrs Gandhi. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the Privy Purse
abolition and bank nationalisation cases was considered by
Mrs Gandhi to be judicial overreach, and the reaction was
at once strong and unequivocal. It is believed that on the
advice of Mr Kumaramangalam the conservative and most
senior judges of the Supreme Court who participated in
the majority judgment in the above cases were passed over
for appointment to the post of Chief Justice of India. The
dissenting judge, Mr A N Ray, who was fourth in the line
of seniority, was appointed, and this resulted in the
resignation of the three senior judges (Justices Hegde,
Shelat and Grover). This marked the starting point of the
theory of judicial activism that actually resulted from the
stand-off between the executive and the judiciary.
EARLY CASES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The following Supreme Court cases provide a useful
insight into the growth and development of judicial
activism in independent India.
In the Privy Purse case (Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v
Union of India, 1970) the broad question was whether the
President rightly exercised his power in de-recognising the
princes. In this case, the court ruled that by virtue of
Article 53 of the constitution, the executive power of
union vested in the President must be exercised “in
accordance with law”. That power was intended to be
exercised in aid of, not to destroy, the constitution. An
order merely “de-recognizing” a ruler without providing
for the continuation of the institution of his rule – an
integral part of the constitutional scheme – was therefore
plainly illegal.
In R C Cooper v Union of India (1970), the legislative
competence of Parliament to enact the Banking Companies
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, known as
the Bank Nationalisation Act, was in question. The court
struck down the Act primarily on the ground of
unreasonableness, explaining that the restriction imposed
on the banks to carryon “non-banking business” in effect
made it impossible for the banks, in a commercial sense, to
carry on any business at all.
In Golaknath v State of Punjab (1971), the Supreme Court
while dealing with the constitutional validity of the 17th
Amendment to the constitution evolved the concept of
“prospective overruling” and held that Parliament had no
power to amend Part III of the constitution, or take away,
or abridge any of the fundamental rights.
In the fundamental rights case (Keshavananda Bharti v
State of Kerala, 1973), the Supreme Court rendered a
judgment that can be regarded as an important milestone
in the Indian constitutional jurisprudence. While dealing
the question as to the extent of the amending power
conferred by Article 368 of the constitution, the court
evolved the theory of “basic structure.” A bench of 13
judges held by a majority of 7:6 that the Parliament had
wide powers to amend the constitution extending to all
articles of the constitution, but this power could not be
used in an unlimited way to abridge, abrogate or destroy
the “basic structure” or the “basic framework” of the
constitution.
In VC Shukla v Delhi Admin (1980), the court while
dealing with the legislative competence of the state to pass
a law establishing special courts for dealing with offences
committed by persons holding high public ofﬁce, held such
courts to be valid. It also held that the court could strike
down an administrative act if bias or mala fides was proved.
The court in this case clariﬁed that the theory of “basic
structure” would apply only to constitutional amendments
and not to an ordinary law passed by the Parliament or the
state legislature.
In the Bhagalpur Blinding case (Khatri (II) v State of Bihar,
1980), it was held that Article 21 included the right to free
legal aid to the poor and the indigent and the right to be
represented by a lawyer. It was also held that the right to
be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest
must be scrupulously followed.
In Fertilizer Corpn Kamgar Union v Union of India (1981),
the petitioners of a public enterprise challenged the sale of
the plant and machinery of the undertaking, as it resulted
in their retrenchment. The Supreme Court held that sale
resulting in retrenchment had not violated their rights
under Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution, and likened it to
termination of employment due to abolition of posts. The
court ruled that the petitioner did not have the locus standi
to petition under Article 32. While reiterating that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 was
part of the “basic structure” of the constitution, the court 25
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held that since the petitioners’ fundamental rights were not
violated, a petition under Article 32 was not maintainable
even though one under Article 226 may be permissible.
In T V Vaitheeswaran v State of TN (1981), the Supreme
Court held that a delay in the execution of the death
sentence for two years would entitle the prisoner to
commutation of the death sentence to one of life
imprisonment. However, in Sher Singh v State of Punjab
(1983) this view was overruled. In the latter case, the
delay was due to the conduct of the convict.
In the judges transfer case (S P Gupta v Union of India,
1983), the court while dealing with the question of the
meaning of the word “consultation” in Article 124(2) held
that in the matter of the appointment of judges, the
executive is supreme and is not bound by the views
expressed by the Chief Justice of India or the other judges
of the SC. However, this view has been overruled in S C
Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India in 1993 to
ensure judicial supremacy in the appointment of judges.
In the Asian Games case (People’s Union for Democratic
Rights v Union of India, 1982), the court held that workers
temporarily employed by contractors for construction
work were entitled to the beneﬁt of the relevant labour and
industrial laws and to seek for their implementation under
Article 32 of the constitution. The court directed the
government and the concerned authorities to ensure
compliance with the laws in respect of workers connected
with the construction work of the ensuing Asian Games in
Delhi.
In A R Antulay v R S Nayak (1984) the court, while dealing
with the question of prior sanction for prosecution of a
public servant, held that an MLA was not a ‘public servant’
within the meaning of the relevant clauses as he was not
remunerated by the fees paid by the executive in the form
of the State Government.
THE PIL REGIME: A HEYDAY OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM
The proponents of judicial activism were judges like V R
Krishna Iyer, P N Bhagwati, Chinnappa Reddy and D A
Desai, who have rendered many judgments touching upon
basic rights of the people. It is often said that the genesis
of judicial activism lies in the evolution of public interest
litigation and the consequent liberalization of the locus
standi rule. PIL was originally conceived with the noble
objective of empowering the downtrodden, the poor and
the needy by ensuring justice to them by relaxing the rigour
of locus standi. In 1979 in Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar,
the Supreme Court ﬁrst took up a PIL action on behalf of
prisoners awaiting trial who had been languishing in jails
for periods longer than the maximum punishment
prescribed for the offences concerned. The court in this
case issued directions ensuring appropriate relief to the
prisoners. Thereafter, there was no looking back for PIL;
again, in Sunil Batra v Delhi Admin (1980) and in Sheela Barse
v Union of India (1983) the court gave signiﬁcant directions
for the protection of accused and convicts (male and
female) concerning their safety and security, better
conditions in prisons, separate lock-ups for female
prisoners, etc.
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE
The steady growth of principles and doctrines that have
enriched environmental jurisprudence owe their existence
to PIL cases and the accompanying activist approach of the
judiciary. In the Oleum gas leak case, the Supreme Court
formulated the doctrine of absolute liability for harm
caused by hazardous and inherently dangerous industries.
It also gave directions which by implication have expanded
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32.
Thereafter, right from the rural litigation Kendra case,
the court has been propounding principles such as
“sustainable development”, the “polluter pays” principle,
and also adopting certain other principles from
international instruments such as the Stockholm
Declaration, Rio Declaration, Kyoto Protocol, Biodiversity
Convention, the various United Nations Environmental
Programmes, etc. In the Narmada Bachao Andolan case,
the court has ensured that development by way of building
of dams does not take its toll on the employment, shelter
and the homes of people. It has directed the State
Governments concerned to rehabilitate the displaced
people before going ahead. The courts have performed
yeomen service to the welfare of the public, especially in
the areas of custodial deaths, prisoners’ rights, abolition of
bonded labour, labourers’ rights, ﬁxing absolute liability on
hazardous industries, condition of mental homes,
regulating pollution, enlarging the scope of “rights to life”,
etc.
TRESPASSING THE BOUNDARIES:
TRANSFORMATION FROM ACTIVISM TO
OVERREACH
In all the above-mentioned cases the judiciary has called
upon the executive to perform its obligations under the
constitution and the laws. While this was and will continue
to be desirable, it will be against the scheme and
philosophy of the constitution if the judiciary oversteps
and dons the mantle of the executive and the legislature.
While in cases related to labour policy (eg minimum
wages, working conditions etc) and also in respect of issues
related to environmental and ecological matters judicial
behaviour can be perceived to be proactive, judicial
intervention in matters related to ﬁscal policy, (political
affairs, internal proceedings of the legislature etc) can be
categorized as judicial overreach. Frequent interventions
tend to weaken the funding of those two wings of the
constitution, which are expected to perform by
themselves.26
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In the words of Justice J S Verma (former Chief Justice
of India):
“…the judiciary should only compel performance of duty by
the designated authority in case of its inaction or failure,
while a takeover by the judiciary of the function allocated to
another branch is inappropriate. Judicial activism is
appropriate when it is in the domain of legitimate judicial
review. It should neither be judicial ‘adhocism’ nor judicial
tyranny.”
The acknowledgement of this difference between
“judicial activism” and “judicial overreach” is vital for the
smooth functioning of a constitutional democracy with the
separation of powers as its central characteristic and
supremacy of the constitution as the foundation of its
ediﬁce.
Glaring instances of judicial overreach include the police
reforms case; the sealing of unauthorised commercial
operations in Delhi; demolition of unauthorised
constructions in the city of Chennai and the creation of a
Monitoring Committee to oversee the same; the judgment
of the Supreme Court in S R Bommai v Union of India (1994)
laying down that the Presidential Proclamation dissolving a
State Legislative Assembly is subject to judicial review and
that if the court strikes down the proclamation, it has the
power to restore the dismissed State Government to ofﬁce;
the Supreme Court’s directions to videograph the
proceedings of the Jharkhand Assembly and the
appointment of a temporary speaker and convening of a
special session in the Assembly; declaring as
unconstitutional the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly by
the Governor thereby diluting the status of the
constitutional functionary in Buta Singh’s case; creating a
central empowered committee (CEC) and giving it powers
like that of judicial body; judicial legislation in Vishakha’s
case regarding the prevention of sexual harassment of
women in the workplace; the creation of a high-powered
Committee to monitor parking charges; the wearing of
helmets; parking space; one-way trafﬁc; black ﬁlm or
vehicle windows; removal of billboards; the usurping of the
functions of the TN Public Service Commission by the
High Court in the matter of recruitment of District Judges;
interference in the educational policies of the Government
in examples such as the TMA Pai Foudation case and the
Islamic Academy case, to cite a few.
Even the recent Gujarat fake encounter case, in which
the court has decided to monitor the investigation and take
over the role of the investigating agency while not
entrusting the case to the CBI, is a case of over-stepping
the constitutional thin line which is the mythological
lakshman rekha.
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT: NEED OF THE HOUR
The Supreme Court has on various occasions highlighted
the importance of judicial restraint for the maintenance of
the delicate balance of power of the different limbs in a
democracy. Justice Markandey Katju in Minor
Priyadarshini’s case (2005 (3) CTC 449) has explained
thus:
“Under the Constitution, the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary have their own broad spheres of operation. It is,
therefore, important that these three organs of the state do
not encroach upon the domain of another and confine
themselves to their own, otherwise the delicate balance in the
Constitution will be upset… The judiciary must therefore
exercise self-restraint and eschew the temptation to act as a
super legislature. By exercising restraint, it will only enhance
its own respect and prestige… Judicial restraint is consistent
with and complementary to the balance of power among the
three independent branches of the state. It accomplishes this
in two ways. First it not only recognizes the equality of the
other two branches with the judiciary, it also fosters that
equality by minimizing inter-branch interference by the
judiciary… Second, it tends to protect the independence of
the judiciary… If judges act like legislators or administrators
it follows that judges should be elected like legislators or
selected and trained like administrators. The touchstone of
an independent judiciary has been its removal from the
political and administrative process… Thus, judicial restraint
complements the twin, overarching values of the independence
of the judiciary and the separation of powers.”
In the recent cash for query case (Raja Ram Pal v Hon’ble
Speaker, Lok Sabha, 2007) a constitution bench of the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of the
legislature to expel their members, that the legislature is
supreme in its own sphere, and it is the sole authority to
deal with and regulate its internal proceedings and other
affairs.
The Madras High Court has passed the following order
in the course of dealing with a PIL case which assailed an
executive order regarding the free distribution of colour
television sets to eligible families in Tamil Nadu State.
“The scheme is with the proven object of uplift of the poor,
needy and under privileged to render social justice, to make
them aware of the worldly happenings. A free hand should be
given to the Government in spending public money for such
purposes. Courts cannot poke their nose into each and every
activity of the Government, particularly in the economic
activities of the Government, under the garb of judicial review
(The Hindu, June 26, 2007).”
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The adoption of such an all powerful attitude by the
judiciary does not augur well for a healthy democracy. This
is underscored by the fact that judiciary as an institution is
not accountable to the people in the same way as the
legislature and the executive. The actions of the executive
are subject to judicial review when there is social,
economic or political injustice – or departure from the
provisions of law and the constitution. When the
legislature makes laws beyond constitutional bounds or 27
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acts arbitrarily contrary to its basic structure, the highest
court examines and corrects. When the judiciary is guilty
of excesses, only a larger Bench or a constitutional
amendment can intervene. Even today, the only mode of
removal of judges as prescribed in the constitution is
impeachment, which is too Herculean a task to be easily
undertaken. This lack of accountability requires the
judiciary to watch its step and exercise self-restraint. Not
long ago, a judicial statesman (the late Chief Justice Ismail
Mohamed of South Africa) said:
“The independence of judiciary and the legitimacy of its claim
to credibility and esteem must in the last instance rest on the
integrity and the judicial temper of the judges, the intellectual
and emotional equipment they bring to bear upon the process
of adjudication, the personal qualities of character they
project, and the parameters they seek to identify on the
exercise of judicial power. Judicial power is potentially no
more immune from vulnerability to abuse than legislative or
executive power but the difference is this: the abuse of
legislative or executive power can be policed by an independent
judiciary but there is no effective constitutional mechanism to
police the abuse of judicial power. It is therefore crucial for
all judges to remain vigilantly alive to the truth that the
potentially awesome breath of judicial POWER is matched by
the real depth of judicial RESPONSIBILITY. Judicial
responsibility becomes all the more onerous upon judges
constitutionally protected in a state of jurisprudential solitude
where there is no constitutional referee to review their own
wrongs.”
ABUSE OF POWER OF CONTEMPT
The use of the power of contempt by the higher courts
has often been uncalled for and unregulated. There are
more instances of abuse of the contempt power than its
use. Veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar states that “the
unpalatable truth is that the judiciary, for some years, has
been struck with its own image of authority and truth.”
The governance of our Republic, in the totality of
administration, is vested in the trinity of executive,
legislature, and the judiciary. In a democratic Republic like
India the constitution is supreme, and the rule of law
requires that every organ of the state, adhere to
constitutional policy.
WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
A former Solicitor General of India, Mr Dipankar
P Gupta, wrote (Hindustan Times, June 15, 2007):
“There is a real danger that the activism of the courts may
aggravate the activism of the authorities. Today, inconvenient
decisions are left by the executive for the courts to take.
Extensive use of judicial powers in the administrative filed may
well, in the long-run, blunt the judicial powers themselves.
This is not a healthy situation.
“What then is the solution? The task of the court should be
to compel the authorities to act and to pass appropriate
executive orders rather than substitute judicial orders for
administrative ones. They must be told how their duties are
to be properly discharged and then commanded to do so. For
this, they must be held accountable to the court.”
The Supreme Court recently noted in Indian Drugs &
Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Workmen (2007) 1 SCC 408 that:
“the Supreme Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of the
executive or legislature… There is a broad separation of
powers under the Constitution of India, and the judiciary,
too, must know its limits”
• This article is taken from a lecture given at the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies on July 4, 2007.
R Shunmugasundaram
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